Developing new scenarios for water allocation negotiations: a case study of the Euphrates River Basin

Abstract. Mismanagement and uneven distribution of water may lead to or increase conflict among countries. Allocation of water among trans-boundary river neighbours is a key issue in utilization of shared water resources. The bankruptcy theory is a cooperative Game Theory method which is used when the amount of demand of riparian states is larger than total available water. In this study, we survey the application of seven methods of Classical Bankruptcy Rules (CBRs) including Proportional (CBR-PRO), Adjusted Proportional (CBR-AP), Constrained Equal Awards (CBR-CEA), Constrained Equal Losses (CBR-CEL), Piniles (CBR-Piniles), Minimal Overlap (CBR-MO), Talmud (CBR-Talmud) and four Sequential Sharing Rules (SSRs) including Proportional (SSR-PRO), Constrained Equal Awards (SSR-CEA), Constrained Equal Losses (SSR-CEL) and Talmud (SSR-Talmud) methods in allocation of the Euphrates River among three riparian countries: Turkey, Syria and Iraq. However, there is not a certain documented method to find more equitable allocation rule. Therefore, in this paper, a new method is established for choosing the most appropriate allocating rule which seems to be more equitable than other allocation rules to satisfy the stakeholders. The results reveal that, based on the new propose model, the CBR-AP seems to be more equitable to allocate the Euphrates River water among Turkey, Syria and Iraq.