Articles | Volume 374
Proc. IAHS, 374, 9–15, 2016
https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-374-9-2016
Proc. IAHS, 374, 9–15, 2016
https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-374-9-2016

  17 Oct 2016

17 Oct 2016

Developing new scenarios for water allocation negotiations: a case study of the Euphrates River Basin

Mohammad Reza Jarkeh et al.

Cited articles

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Short summary
In this paper we established a new method to choose the most appropriate allocating rule which seems to be more equitable and reasonable than other allocation rules to satisfy the riparian countries. To evaluate this new proposed method, we applied seven Classical Bankruptcy Rules (CBRs) and four Sequential Sharing Rules (SSRs) in allocating the Euphrates River water among three riparian countries: Turkey, Syria and Iraq.